The call made by Cemil Bayık for the United States to be an “observer” in the reconciliation process was a code.
It provided the best clue for us to understand ISIL and Kobane; why the reconciliation process faced a crisis; and why the Oct. 6-8 events occurred.
It was an important window that allowed us to understand the new conjecture and to understand the “new situation,” which is the new relationship model between the United States and the PKK.
But the cipher I will share with you is in regard to Ankara’s approach.
As far as I can tell, the state faced a traumatic situation when the events of Oct. 6-8, which sought to extinguish the spark of hope generated by the reconciliation process, occurred, despite the “road map” that was discussed with the HDP, (Peoples’ Democratic Party) Qandil, (the mountain base of the PKK in northern Iraq) and with Abdullah Öcalan.
A sense of being cheated…
This is why the events of Oct. 6-8 paved the way for the process to be reconsidered.
There is no doubt that the reconciliation process is the right way forward but it became inevitable that the management of the process needed to face a “checks and balances” operation.
In my article titled “Kobane is small, the game being played is huge” I had written and explained this plan as: “An autonomous region was established for the Kurds that cooperated with the United States against Saddam in Iraq. A similar ploy is being prepared in Syria. The PYD, [Democratic Union Party, the Syrian affiliate of the PKK] which has allied with the United States, will be gifted with an autonomous Rojava.
There is a second part to this plan that I will share.
The Syrian conjecture was the biggest impediment to the reconciliation process. Qandil was drawing attention to the “Syrian reality” even in its first response to Öcalan’s letter. In time the Syrian conjecture became even more potent. It became a ploy to redesign the region.
We are persistently trying to explain that attempts are being made to redesign the region on the pretext of Kobane.
While designs are being made on the region, attempts are being made to make us foot a large part of the bill.
The United States is playing two cards in this regard:
1-ISIL
2-PKK-PYD
With regard to Iraq, the first thing ISIL did was take hostage the officials in the Turkish consulate. If as claimed, ISIL represents Sunni Arabs then what problem would it have with Turkey? Why would this organization that was headed toward Baghdad, a capital ruled previously by Sunni Arabs but now under Shia administration, turn around and attack Arbil, which is administered by Sunni Kurds?
How does the United States, which can detect the movement of a fly in Iraq, fail to notice thousands of ISIL militants that crossed into Iraq from Syria in Toyota vehicles? Did ISIL become a threat when it attacked Kobane, whereas it was ignored when it took control of Mosul in Iraq and advanced to the gates of Arbil and then returned to Syria?
All this is part of a plan.
There are two places being threatened via ISIL and the PKK:
1-Turkey
2-Barzani’s regional administration.
Turkey was expected to be the first to come to Barzani’s aid, who it is in a strategic partnership with, when ISIL was approaching Arbil. No delays were expected. A decision was taken in this regard. Turkey was left in a difficult situation because of one of the internal mechanisms of the state proceeded on the basis of the perceptions left over from old Turkey.
How do you expect to both reach an agreement on oil with Barzani and then not immediately rush to the rescue when Arbil is faced with a life or death situation? This is not the way to become a strong power in the Middle East.
The second stage of the cooperation between the United States and the PKK, “targets bypassing Turkey for the transfer of Iraqi oil and the laying of oil pipelines based on the 36th parallel and using the Iraqi and Syrian corridor to move the oil to the Mediterranean.”
I will limit comment on this matter and would only like to highlight the struggle being waged by Energy Minister Taner Yıldız to counter the pressure being applied by U.S. officials to prevent the flow of Kurdish oil to Turkey.
Cemil Bayık’s attempts to include the United States in the reconciliation process, and the extension of his visit to the United States by the co-chairman of the HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş, are just the outwardly visible signs of this relationship.
I have drawn attention to the dangers being posed to the reconciliation process and Kurdish oil. Will this situation “spell the end of the search for a solution?”
The PKK wants it to be Turkey that derails the search for a solution.
This was the aim of the Oct. 6-8 events.
Turkey is determined not to derail attempts in the search for a solution.
But this does not mean that it will make compromises with Qandil. Insistence on “public order” has become the norm with regard to the reconciliation process in the wake of the events of Oct. 6-8.
Now “a solution to the Kurdish problem” and “public authority” are being kept in separate baskets.
At the same time the events of Oct. 6-8 showed that Qandil is trying to limit Öcalan’s influence.
When former U.S. President Johnson had issued a threat, İsmet Paşa had responded, “the world will be reshaped and Turkey will take its place within it.” The search for a solution will go on. If the PKK flees the table where talks are being held, Ankara will continue the process by turning to the Kurdish public and will also include other elements.
The PKK, which has become spoiled due to the relationship it has forged with the United States, will be handled on a separate plane.
I have written the worst-case scenario here.
The cipher for the new process will be the PKK’s renouncing of an armed struggle against Turkey.
The PKK, which has not kept its word until now on the subjects of withdrawing its forces and the road map, will announce that it has renounced its armed struggle against Turkey.
The processes of normalization or of being an observer will follow after that.
We are passing through a difficult phase in the name of a solution.
